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Imperfect Substitutes, Deferred Producer Payment System, and State Trading 
Enterprises: An Empirical Test of Leadership in the Global Malting Barley Markets  
Fengxia Dong, Kyle Stiegert, Tom Marsh 
Introduction 
  The role and behavior of state trading enterprises (STEs) became a sensitive and 
central political issue following the Uruguay Round of GATT and the subsequent 
development of an international hard law framework for managing trade disputes.  The major 
issue of concern has been the single desk export marketing function of several large STEs 
such as the Canadian Wheat Board, Australian Wheat Board, and the Australian Barley 
Board.  The fundamental question was whether or not STEs could maintain and/or advance a 
distortionary market presence while the rest of the world made significant commitments to 
free, undistorted trade via tariffication of quotas, scheduled tariff reductions and a real or at 
least perceived loss of national autonomy through the WTO trade dispute process.   
Previous empirical research suggested that STEs have exerted a long-term leadership 
role in grain export markets (see, e.g., Paarlberg and Abbott; Schmitz and Furtan), while 
other studies have shown considerable skepticism about such claims (Carter; and Carter, 
Lyons and Berwald).  Carter et. al’s scathing assessment of the CWB’s cost management 
practices seems to suggest that even if any rents are captured from the export market, they do 
not pass to farmers in Canada.  Furthermore, until recently, all of the past empirical literature 
lacks a consistent argument to explain the mechanism through which an STE could maintain 
such a leadership position.  Consequently, the empirical evidence supporting claims of 
market leadership was either indirect or anecdotal.     3
Hamilton and Stiegert indicate that the deferred producer payment system used by 
most STE’s could provide the very mechanism to generate a leadership outcome.  The STEs 
typically pay upstream producers a below-market price, and then later provide lump-sum 
reimbursement after proceeds are generated in a downstream international market. The 
delayed payment approach is capable of creating a credible marginal cost advantage for STEs 
in the international market.  In this way, the prepayment system becomes the critical 
precommitment mechanism necessary for market leadership (Brander and Spencer, 1984, 
1985). 
Hamilton and Stiegert (2002) found that the observed levels of deferred payments 
used by the Canadian Wheat Board in international durum markets were statistically not 
different from the Stackelberg leader markdown in 17 of 23 study years.  Further, the 
Wilcoxen nonparametric test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the deferred producer 
payment system generated the Stackelberg leadership.  While the durum market is not large 
relative to other feed and food grains, this initial study pointed to a very plausible explanation 
for why the CWB could attain its perceived price leadership status in hard wheat markets.     
In this paper, we wish to extend from Hamilton and Stiegert to develop the theoretical 
framework to consider multiple STEs competing for exports with differentiated products.  
Specifically we build a framework that is parameter driven and links easily to a test of 
market leadership for the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and Australian Barley Board 
(ABB) in the world malting barley market.   
Background  
The CWB and ABB:  The major exporters of bulk malting barley are Australia, 
Canada, and the European Union. They account for about 90% of the world malting barley   4
exports in the year 1996-97, with market shares of about 52%, 32% and 6%, respectively 
(Center for international Economics (CIE)). The Canadian Wheat board (CWB) and the 
Australian Barley Board (ABB) are the two STEs operating in the international market for 
malting barley.  The CWB is a single-desk state trading agency responsible for the marketing 
of all wheat and barley sold for human domestic consumption and for export with the 
jurisdiction over Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and a small section of British Columbia. 
Those areas typically produce 95 percent of the Canadian barley crop.  The ABB oversees 
only barley marketing; Australian wheat is marketed through a separate STE (Australian 
Wheat Board).   
One of the major responsibilities of the CWB is to market wheat and barley in order 
to maximize returns to prairie producers. At the beginning of each crop year, the government 
establishes initial producer payments for grain sold to the CWB. The initial payment is 
usually well below the final pooled price, normally set at 70 to 85 percent of the total 
estimated pool return. The farmers get an initial payment upon delivery, which is guaranteed 
by the government. Once the CWB has marketed all the grain in a particular pool, the 
revenue is pooled, and freight and handling charges are deducted. If returns to pool exceed 
the sum of initial payment, then a final payment is distributed to each individual producer 
based on the relative producer share of grain in that particular pool. Should returns fall short, 
the federal government will make up the difference. 
Australia produces barley in 5 states: South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia, 
New South Wales, and Queensland.  The Australian Barley Board (ABB) has the sole right 
to export barley grown in South Australia and Victoria.  The ABB accounted for about 56% 
of barley exports from Australia in 1995-96 (57% for feed barley and 54% for malting   5
barley)(CIE). The domestic market for malting barley is effectively controlled through the 
single desk power of the ABB. One of the objectives of the ABB is to maximize the net 
returns to Victorian and South Australian growers who deliver barley or other grain to a pool 
of the Board by securing, developing and maintaining markets for grain, and minimizing 
costs as far as practicable (Victorian and South Australian Barley Marketing Act 1993). The 
ABB’s prepayment system is similar to that of CWB. In 1999, the ABB was privatized and 
changed to ABB Grain Ltd. It’s single desk export rights for barley from South Australia and 
Victoria was exempted in July, 2001.  
Supply and Demand of Malting Barley:  Demand for malting barley is derived from 
the demand for malt, which in turn is driven by the demand for beer.  For marketing 
purposes, barley is classed into feed and malting varieties. Malting barley is simply high-
quality barley that has the appropriate characteristics to produce good malt. The supply of 
malting-quality barley has an important spatial dimension. Breeding programs, agronomic 
practices, soil characteristics, climatic conditions, and expected price differentials determine 
variety types grown in different regions. Although malting varieties comprise about one half 
or more of total barley production in many countries, only about 10% of world barley 
production is actually malted. The other 90%, whether malting or feed varieties, is used as 
feed (Bi-weekly Bulletin). The malting barley is further divided into two-row (2R) and six-
row white (6RW) aleurone barley and six-row blue aleurone (6RB) varieties, for which 
brewer demands differ. 
Farmers in Canada grow both 2-row and 6-row varieties of barley. Since 1991, 
plantings of 6-row white varieties have increased much due to the contracts for the U.S. 
market. Australian barley producers almost exclusively plant 2-row varieties.  Variety type   6
has an important impact on extraction rates and taste (Schmitz, Gray, and Ulrich). Brewers, 
the end-users of malting barley, have specific quality requirements in terms of acceptable 
varieties, protein, moisture, plumpness, germination and tolerances for damaged kernels. In 
general, in the world market, malt demand consists almost entirely of two-row varieties, 
except U.S. and some North American brewers make extensive use of malt produced with 
six-row white aleurone barley. China is now the world’s largest malting barley importer, 
accounting for about 38% of world import (Center for International Economics). Australia 
has a competitive advantage for exports into Asia, particularly into China, because Australian 
barley varieties germinate in one day, while Canadian and EU barley varieties germinate in 
three days (Bi-weekly bulletin). The U.S. has been Canada’s largest market for six-row 
malting barley. Although the U.S. is a major producer of malting barley, its high beer 
consumption results in a net import demand for six-row malting barley.        
Theoretical Structure 
Initial payments for commodities brokered by the CWB and the ABB usually set 
substantially below-market prices: usually at 70-85% of the total payment. Consequently, the 
delayed payment approach is capable of providing the necessary precommitment to shift rent 
by creating a credible marginal cost advantage for the STEs in an international market. 
Moreover, in the case of STEs, the final payment in a delayed producer payment system, 
which is typically delivered in lump-sum fashion, provides an explicit method of transfer 
back to the input supplier that rationalizes the system. So the delayed producer payment 
structure is equivalent in this regard to a policy of direct export subsidization.  
            We begin with a theoretical model that proposes endogenous control of an upstream 
supply in that STEs choose the initial prices of their principal material, given that they   7
compete in a market of imperfect substitutes. Through the procedure of marketing and 
producer payments by STEs, we consider STEs and producers as vertically connected.  The 
vertical structure analyzed here consists of two stages. The first stage is an output stage, in 
which the STEs and other exporting firms maximize profits by choosing quantities and 
maintain the ability to either store non-optimal supplies or downgrade the quality of non-
optimal supplies sale to a residual market, feed barley market. We estimate the output stage 
by considering government trade policy as a shift parameter in the domestic marginal cost 
function. The second stage is a precommitment stage, in which both STEs simultaneously 
choose their initial payments for the material input. In this stage, we employ a subset of the 
output-stage results to characterize the value of the trade policy parameter associated with the 
optimal degree of rent-shifting. 
As introduced in the first part, agronomic practices, soil characteristics, and climatic 
conditions determine varietal types grown in different regions, and the brewers have specific 
quality requirements in terms of acceptable varieties, protein, plumpness and germination. 
Therefore we consider the malting barley market as consisting of imperfect substitutes. Let x, 
y, and z represent total supply of the malting barley to the world market by CWB, ABB, and 
the other malting barley-exporting countries, respectively and denote the downstream inverse 
demand functions of malting barley marketed by CWB, ABB and Other Exporting Countries 
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Öi are exogeneous variables.  If barley varieties were perfect substitutes or homogeneous, all 
demands would have same price; if barley varieties were imperfect substitutes, each demand 
change would have different effect on each price. 
          In the output stage, the marketing costs are assumed to be linear in output and are 
subsumed into the market price. The STEs and the other exporting countries choose their 
outputs to maximize profits. 
() ccc MaxxPxwx p =-                  (4) 
() aaa MaxyPywy p =-                (5) 
() ooo MaxzPzcz p =-                  (6) 
where wc and wa are initial payments set in the precommitment stage; and c0 is the price 
received by farmers of other exporting countries. 
          Assume that the CWB (c), the ABB (a) and the Other exporting countries (o) are in 
Cournot competition. Maximization of (4), (5) and (6) with respect to x, y, and z, 
respectively yield the first order conditions: 
1 0 ccc PxPw +-=                                   (7) 
2 0 aaa PyPw +-=                                  (8) 
3 0 ooo PzPc +-=                                     (9) 
In the precommitment stage, the STEs select transfer prices, wc and wa, so as to 
((,,),(,,),(,,))(,,)(,,) cpccaccaacaocacccac MaxPxwwcywwczwwcxwwccxwwc p =-     (10) 
((,,),(,,),(,,))(,,)(,,) apacaccaacaocaaacaa MaxPxwwcywwczwwcywwccywwc p =-    (11) 
where cc and ca are the unit production cost in Canada and Australia, and pcp and pap are the 
profit of producers under CWB and ABB, respectively.  
          Letting w*’s denote the optimal initial payments, the upstream prices set by the STEs 





()              (12)


































































































13131 )() coo PPzP +
 
Pij is the derivative of Pi w.r.t j; Pijk is the cross derivative of Pi w.r.t. j and k (i=c,a,o; j, 
k=1,2,3, which represents x, y, and z, respectively).   
            The profit-maximizing upstream transfer prices set by the STEs specify that domestic 
upstream producers sell the input at a price below marginal cost if wi<ci (i=c,a), which 
increases market shares in the international malting barley market in an analogous fashion as 
a domestic output subsidy.   10
Empirical Methodology 
          Let gij denote the conjectural variation, which indicates firm i’s expectations about the 
reaction of firm j to a change in its quantity. Different choices of the conjectural variations in 
output lead directly to the relevant first-order conditions for the various models: in the 
Cournot model, gij=0, each firm believes that the other firm’s choice is independent from its 
own.  Therefore, the conjectural variations model arises by assuming each firm views rivals’ 
output as a function of it’s own output. Because the reaction of foreign marketing agents to a 
change in the quantity of domestic exports is endogenous in the precommitment stage, this 
implies that the conduct parameter associated with the domestic marketing agent is 
predetermined. Hence, the conduct of the domestic marketing agent could be estimated as a 
free parameter in the output stage. Consequently, we can test the rent-shifting hypothesis 
after evaluating the market power. 
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 We set My/Mx=g12, Mz/Mx=g13, Mx/My=g21, Mz/My=g23, Mx/Mz=g31, and My/Mz=g32. If the 
CWB, the ABB and Other exporting countries are in Cournot equilibrium, then all gij’s will 
be zero.   We can now write (14), (15), and (16) as following:  
1122133 ()0 ccccc PxPPPw gg +++-=             (17) 
2112233 ()0 aaaaa PyPPPw gg +++-=             (18) 
3113223 ()0 ooooo PzPPPc gg +++-=                (19)   11
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 In equations (17), (18) and (19), the departure of g’s from zero value is a logically consistent 
test of whether the Cournot-Nash model provides an accurate description of the industry 
equilibrium. Under the Cournot hypothesis, the optimal initial payments of the CWB and the 
ABB in (20) and (21) are in accordance with (12) and (13).  
            To test the hypothesis that the CWB and ABB strategically utilize their pre-payment 
systems and product differentiation to shift rents from other foreign firms, we need to 
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In (22), if i=c, then the first item will be cancelled out by first order condition; and if i=a, 
then the second term will be cancelled out. ￿X/￿wj (X=x,y,and z) has been defined and 
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If ￿ðc/￿wc<0 and ￿ði/￿wc>0 (i= a, or o), then CWB is strategically utilize their pre-payment 
system to shift rents from country i. Similar analysis could be applied to ABB.  
Data and Empirical Analysis 
In order to evaluate the degree of market power, and further test rent shifting, we 
need to identify g’s.    13




()()          (27)
()()        (28)













                     
The market power parameters in above equations are the coefficients ëij’s with a 
negative sign, that is, ãij =-ëij. 
Hence, we need to recover the quantity derivatives of prices. We did this by utilizing 
Rotterdam model with symmetry, homogeneity and curvature imposed.  



































qi is the quantity of the good i (i=1,2, 3, which represents c, a, o, respectively); n=3; 
j=1,2,3, which represents c, a, and o, respectively; mi is the budget share of good i; and bi and 
cij are the parameters we need to estimate. With symmetry, homogeneity and negativity (or 
curvature) imposed, Ói bi=1 cij=cji, Ói cij=0 and cii<0. The appropriate curvature can be 
imposed by estimating the Cholesky decomposition, which is shown by Featherstone and 
Moss. If C is the matrix of parameters cij, then C is a negative definite matrix to ensure 








































Obviously, A is positive definite and consequently, C is negative definite. 
After estimating parameters, b and c, we can recover the income elasticities and 
compensated elasticities. And then using Slustsky equation, we can get uncompensated 
elasticities. Hence, the derivatives of prices with respect to quantities could be recovered.  
Data Description 
Annual data on quantities, prices of CWB and ABB sales, and initial payments to 
producers for CWB and ABB were collected for the period of 1975/76 to 1997/98 from 
CWB and ABB annual report. The sales of other countries were estimated by the world total 
disappearance of barley deducted by feed use and then by CWB and ABB sales. The annual 
data on world total disappearance of barley were collected for the same period from various 
issues of U.S. Department of Agriculture: Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook. The prices 
of malting barley in US principal market were used as a substitute of that for other countries. 
The GDP deflator for each country was used to deflate the nominal variables for each 
country and was collected from the International Monetary Fund publication: International 
Financial Statistics. All price variables were changed into U.S dollars.   15
Empirical Results 
With homogeneity, symmetry, and curvature imposed, we estimated the Rotterdam 
model with 3 goods as a demand system. The results are shown in table 1. 
Table 1. Estimates of Rotterdam Modle 
                                          Coefficient                                t-ratio 
b1                                       -0.002148                               -0.58647 
a11                                        0.17429**                             4.7155 
a12                                       -0.13547**                           -2.0739 
b2                                          0.001339                              0.54941 
a22                                        0.14723                                  1.1943 
       Note: ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level 
            The Value of cij by Calculation 
c11                 -0.0303785                      c21                  0.0236113                c31                        0.0067672 
c12            0.0236113                      c22           -0.0400281                c32                                     0.0164167 
c13            0.0067672                      c23            0.0164167                c33                       -0.0231839 
c13, c23, and c33 was recovered by homogeneity. c12=c21, c13=c31, and c23=c32  were by 
symmetry.   
The income elasticities and compensated price elasticities could be calculated from 
estimates of parameters, and uncompensated price elasticities could be recovered by Slutsky 
equation. Income elasticity is ei=bi/mi, compensated price elasticity is eij=cij/mi, and 
uncompensated price elasticity is eij-ei by Slustsky equation. From uncompensated price 
elasticities, we could get the first derivatives of prices with respect to each quantity.  
The estimates of uncompensated price elasticities are listed in table 2   16
Table 2. Mean of the Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
                               CWB                   ABB                       Others    
CWB                    -1.1158               0.87049                    0.32432 
ABB                      1.6931                -2.8761                    1.0868 
Others                    1.4373                 1.0998                  -0.96438                    
The own price elasticity for CWB is –1.1158, and cross price elasticities for CWB are 
0.87049 and 0.32432 with respect to ABB and Others, respectively. Therefore, the ABB 
price has bigger effect on CWB than Others does. Similarly, CWB has bigger price effect on 
ABB than others does. In addition, CWB has bigger price effect on Others than ABB does.   
            Since we have got the quantity derivatives of price, the market power parameters 
could be identified. Using SUR to solve (27), (28), and (29), we got the estimates of market 
power parameters, ãij’s, which are listed in table 3. 
Table 3. Estimates of market power parameters.  
                                 Coefficient                          t-ratio 
ë12=- ã12                              -0.73284**                        -302.43 
ë13=- ã13                     -0.16230**                       -9.1831 
ë21=- ã21                      -0.61563**                      -66.567 
ë23=- ã23                      0.0025981                         0.9615 
ë31=- ã31                               0.72682                              1.0255 
ë32=- ã32                      -0.89027                            -0.7981 
From the above results, we can see that CWB and ABB are more collusive. 
Substituting the market power parameters and quantity derivatives into (17) and (18), we fail 
to reject that Pc-wc is greater than Pa –wa. Therefore, we can conclude that CWB has higher   17
mark up than ABB does and consequently, CWB has more market power. In addition, ã13 is 
significant and  ã31 is not significant, we can conclude that CWB has the market leadership 
toward Stackerberg. But ABB doesn’t have this market leadership. The ABB and the other 
exporting countries seem in Cournot equilibrium.  
The second derivatives of prices could be derived from the Rotterdam model. 
Consequently, the hypothesis of rent shifting could be testable. We can do this by evaluating 
(23), (24), (25) and (26). And we can evaluate if the STEs set the initial payments at optimal 
levels by (20) and (21). Since we haven’t got the data on the production costs, the test of the 
hypothesis and evaluation of the initial payments will be done in the future.  
Conclusions 
          Because the reaction of foreign marketing agents to a change in the quantity of 
domestic exports is endogenous in the precommitment stage, this implies that the conduct 
parameter is pre-determined. The conduct is estimated as a free parameter in the output stage. 
The parameters estimated in the output stage also define the optimal level at which the 
government precommitment variable should be set. Consequently, if the necessary condition 
for rent-shifting behavior is not refutable, it is possible to calculate the optimal 
precommitment level and test whether the observed trade policy parameter is set in a fashion 
consistent with theory. 
            The purpose of this paper was to derive an applicable method to evaluate the market 
power and to test the hypothesis of rent shifting behavior in international malting barley 
market, in which the CWB and the ABB operate as STEs and the exported product is 
imperfect substitute. The empirical framework was also developed and requires parameter   18
estimate for demand under the assumption of product heterogeneity.  Future research will 
consider the effect of EU export subsidy and get the data on the production costs to test the 
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